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REPLY TO O'CONNOR
Steven S. Aspenson

In this reply I consider David O'Connor's article "A Variation on the Free Will Defense"
in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is
required for the possibility of "morally creditable frec choice." I argue that O'Connor's
reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral
without the property he calls "p." that an altered understanding of what "morally creditable
free choice" is would not help. and finally, that if God's moral condition is fundamentally
different than ours, it could not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans
being moral.

In his article "A Variation on the Free Will Defense," I David O'Connor tries to
show that "natural evil" is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of
"morally creditable free choice." I shall show,
1) that O'Connor's reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in
showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls "p," the property
of being prone to choosing possible evils which he takes to be a natural evil,
2) that an altered understanding of what "morally creditable free choice" is
would not help, and finally,
3) that if God's moral condition is fundamentally different than ours, it could
not be used as an example of p being inessential for humans being moral.

O'Connor calls being "prone to choosing possible evils" property p and takes
property p to be a natural evil according to a tradition that, if a kind of thing
could be better without it, it is a natural evil.
He also claims
If moral credit is to be earned, the possible evils resisted or rejected
have to be tempting to some significant degree . . . it is internal to the
concept of moral achievement that we be, let us say, prone to choosing
possible evils.'

That is, if one has moral achievement, then one has the natural evil p.
One of the objections he anticipates, the second, is
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. that humans not having p could never be moral beings; that being
moral is objectively a better human state than being non-moral; thus,
that p, being necessary for the former, could not be a natural evil. 3

That is, since moral humans are better humans, p is not a natural evil of humans.
His reply to this objection was the following:
Being moral is not impossible without p, because, presumably God, by
definition, would be both moral and without the attribute p. 4
But that reply obscures the point of the objection because the question here is
not "is it possible to be moral without the property p?" but rather "is it possible
for humans to be moral without the property p?" If that point were explicitly
addressed the reply would have read
Being moral is not impossible for humans without p, because, presumably God, by definition, would be both moral and without the attribute p.
That reply is ineffective because if we substitute for the property p, the property
q, which is, let us say, the property of "having a body" and substitute "alive"
for "moral," we have the following:
Being alive is not impossible for humans without q, because, presumably
God, by definition, would be both alive and without the attribute q.
Obviously that does not show that humans can "be alive" without a body, and
similarly it does not follow that humans can be moral without the property p
simply because God can. In fact, nothing about humans follows from any claim
about only God. So O'Connor has not shown humans can be moral without the
natural evil p, and the objection he anticipates (that on his view p is required
for humans being moral and thus not a natural evil of humans) has not been
successfully rebutted.

II
O'Connor might reply to this that all that follows is that since p is not a natural
evil of humans, humans are incapable of moral achievement. But that is unlikely.
Rather, he may claim MCFC (morally creditable free choice,) which he apparently
takes to be necessary for moral achievement, is one of the following:
A) a free choice which is capable of rendering the agent praiseworthy, and
therefore moral
B) a free choice which renders an already moral agent more mature
and he may then claim he takes MCFC to be B whereas I have construed it to be A.
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So, I may have misunderstood just what he takes morally creditable free choice
to be, which is understandable since O'Connor's formulation of it is ambiguous
between A and B. What would make B attractive to him is that an already moral
agent might not need p, a possibility he brings up in a later context to which
my remarks apply insofar as humans are the agents considered. In particular his
replies to the third 5 and fourth 6 objections, as well as the posing of the fourth
objection, are based on the supposed (logical?) possibility that there is a world
" ... in which human beings do not have p and are moral to begin with,"7 that
is, they are correctly described by B and not by A, the topic to which I now tum.
What O'Connor needs for moral maturity if B describes what he takes it to
be, apart from whether p is required, is some property, call it r, which would
be something like "the capacity to gain moral virtues by practice and habit," a
fa Aristotle, and this property does not seem to be a defect.
What then becomes of A and B? That distinction breaks down because whether
one is already moral or one becomes moral the following seems to be true of
humans.
C) If there were no conditions in which a being S could find it attractive to
refrain from what would make one morally praiseworthy, then S could never be
morally praiseworthy and

D) any being that could never be morally praiseworthy could never be a moral
being
then, given C and D, there is something required for being moral and becoming
moral, and p is a candidate for it, or a condition of it, and the original objection
that p is a property necessary for humans being moral, and therefore not a natural
evil, retains whatever force it had.
III

Finally, O'Connor's reply that God can be moral without the property p calls
for comment. This, I think, is part of a traditional view that God does not acquire
His praiseworthiness from His choices. That is, since God is praiseworthy, His
choices are also, rather than the alternative that since His choices are praiseworthy,
He is rendered praiseworthy, as though it were possible that God not be praiseworthy.' It would be a mistake, I think, to assume that beings who have their natures
conferred upon them (rather than being self-sufficient e.g., God) could be
praiseworthy, without becoming praiseworthy. At least an argument is needed
to show humans could be created in a morally praiseworthy condition.
This is enough, I think, to show that O'Connor's reply to the second objection
he anticipates to his view (that natural evil is a necessary condition for morally
creditable free choice) was not effective; the objection that p is necessary for
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humans being moral, and therefore not a natural evil, retains whatever force it
had, which at present, prevents use of the replies he offers to the third and fourth
anticipated objections, as well as his posing of the fourth objection.
Q
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